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I. INTRODUCTION
A defendant's mental competence to stand trial is a fundamental
prerequisite to participation in our adversarial system of criminal jus-
tice, but proving that this requirement is satisfied presents unique chal-
lenges. While an incompetent defendant's inability to comprehend the
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nature of the proceedings or to assist his attorney challenges the very
validity of the adversarial system, most jurisdictions rely on that same
adversarial system to resolve questions of competence. These questions
about the competence of the defendant and the legitimate scope of the
adversarial system all arise in the context of the competency hearing
procedure.
The burden of proof in competency hearings has emerged as a sali-
ent issue, deeply dividing courts on the constitutional, moral, and policy
implications. State supreme courts and the federal circuit courts of ap-
peals have split on whether the due process clause permits states to
place the burden of proof in competency hearings on the defendant.
Although the issue has been addressed in many opinions, the question
is benighted by well-intentioned, but misguided rhetoric. Many courts
have tried to address the issue fully; few have realized that the facts of
the specific cases before them disguise this chimerical issue's other fea-
tures. Courts can only undertake a proper analysis of the due process
requirements of the burden of proof in competency hearings after com-
petency jurisprudence has been pruned of useless and confusing argu-
ments and addressed with a full understanding of the role competence
plays in the adversarial system.
This Note analyzes the limitations that the due process clause
places on states in allocating the burden of proof in competency hear-
ings. Part II briefly describes the histories of the competency require-
ment, the standard of competence to stand trial, and the procedures
used in competency decisionmaking. Part III examines in greater detail
the development of the burden of proof in competency hearings and
introduces the contemporary controversy over the allocation of the bur-
den. Part III closes with a description of People v. Medina, the most
recent of the burden of proof decisions, which presents well the argu-
ments for and against a constitutional prohibition against allocating the
burden of proof to the defendant. Part IV assesses the arguments
against a constitutional requirement that states bear the burden of
proof and attempts to free competency jurisprudence from much of the
confusing rhetoric which characterizes the case law. Part V assesses the
arguments for such a constitutional requirement, undertakes a due pro-
cess analysis of the burden of proof, and discusses the role of social
values in allocating the risk of error between litigants in the criminal
justice process. Part V concludes that because of the value society
places on competence, due process requires that the State bear the bur-
den of proof in competency hearings.
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II. THE COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL REQUIREMENT
The requirement of competence to stand trial arose in the common
law out of concern for fairness to the defendant.1 The fiercely adver-
sarial nature of the criminal justice process in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries is difficult for twentieth century observers to imag-
ine: a defendant accused of a serious felony could not be represented by
counsel, and had to plead his own case against an experienced prosecu-
tor.2 With the sides so unevenly matched, it is little surprise that the
law came to view competence as a fundamental prerequisite to the im-
position of the adversarial process on a defendant. Moreover, the justifi-
cations for the competency requirement followed logically from the
defendant's direct participation in the process. These justifications are
four:' it is fundamentally unfair to try an incompetent defendant; it is
inhumane to subject an incompetent defendant to trial and punish-
ment; the trial of an incompetent defendant is inconsistent with the
law's disfavor of trials in absentia;4 and finally, the pathetic spectacle of
the trial of an incompetent defendant diminishes society's respect for
the dignity of the criminal justice process.5 Despite the continued cur-
rency of all four rationales, fairness to the defendant has always been
the principal basis for the requirement.
Fundamental, therefore, to an adversarial system of justice, the
competency requirement is a component of the due process that is
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In 1899 in Yout-
sey v. United States,6 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed this
requirement in quasi-jurisdictional terms, holding that the "fundamen-
1. Blackstone wrote:
[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before arraignment for it, he
becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with
that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes
mad, he shall not be tried: for how can he make his defense? If, after he be tried and found
guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, after
judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says
the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have
alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.
4 WILLAm BLACKSTONE, COMMNTARIES *24-25. See also Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 20 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1847).
2. Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REv. 921, 952
(1985).
3. See generally id. at 952-53; Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. R v. 454,
457-59 (1967).
4. Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA.
L. REv. 832, 834 (1960) (stating that "the mentally incompetent defendant, though physically pre-
sent in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself"); see also Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); Winick, supra note 2, at 952.
5. Freeman v. People, 4 Denio at 20; Winick, supra note 2, at 952.
6. 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899).
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tal right of the court to try the main issue" of guilt or innocence de-
pended upon the defendant's mental competence.'
The United States Supreme Court gave the first definitive explica-
tion of the constitutional requirement in 1966 in Pate v. Robinson.8
Robinson was charged with murdering his wife. His attorney claimed
that Robinson was incompetent to stand trial, but the trial judge re-
jected this argument. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his subse-
quent conviction, holding that the evidence of incompetence was
inadequate to require further judicial inquiry, and that because of the
attorney's failure to request a hearing, Robinson had waived his right to
plead incompetence.' The United States Supreme Court reversed,
wholly rejecting the Illinois court's waiver reasoning, and holding that
waiver is an inapposite concept when the fundamental issue is the de-
fendant's competence. 10 Justice Clark, writing for the Court, also dis-
agreed with Illinois' finding that the evidence had been insufficient to
require a hearing sua sponte and required that state procedures be ade-
quate to protect a defendant's constitutional right to be competent to
stand trial."
Nine years later in Drope v. Missouri,2 the Court imposed on trial
courts a greater responsibility for monitoring the competence of defend-
ants. As in Robinson, state procedures were facially adequate to protect
the defendant's competency right.13 Also like Robinson, in which the
defendant had a long history of disturbed behavior, the trial court had
accorded too little weight to a plain sign of the defendant's possible
incompetence-a suicide attempt during the trial.14 Chief Justice Bur-
ger's majority opinion identified three relevant sources of information
concerning competence: evidence of the defendant's behavior; his de-
meanor at trial; and prior medical opinion on his competence. 5
Because its creation was motivated by concern for the patently dys-
functional quality of the trial of incompetent defendants, 6 the stan-
dards for competence to stand trial are defined in functional terms.
Unlike the standard for insanity with which it is often confused,"7 the
7. Id. at 941; See also Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Bur-
dens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1342 (1977) (describing competence as a
"prerequisite" fact which "determine[s] the appropriateness of the forum").
8. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
9. Id. at 376-77.
10. Id. at 384.
11. Id. at 378.
12. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
13. Id. at 173.
14. Id. at 179.
15. Id. at 180.
16. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847) (criticizing the trial court
[Vol. 45:199202
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standard for competence to stand trial has evolved little."8 Most mod-
ern cases follow the formulation the Supreme Court announced for fed-
eral cases in 1960, in Dusky v. United States."' In a brief per curiam
opinion, the Court agreed with a cooperative Solicitor General" that
the test for competence to stand trial must be "whether [the defendant]
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasona-
ble degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." 21 Al-
though the Supreme Court has never held expressly that states must
apply the standard it announced in Dusky,2 2 states have followed the
same formulation.2" Although the Dusky standard is simply stated, the
means of establishing whether a defendant satisfies the requirement are
not clear.
The constitutional right to a hearing on competence is triggered
when a bona fide doubt 4 arises as to the defendant's competence. In
both ancient and contemporary practice, competency issues are re-
solved in separate proceedings.2 5 The form of the competency proceed-
ing varies among jurisdictions. Some states empanel "lunacy
commissions" (expert panels) to interview the defendant and present
for using "a single criterion of sanity, that is, a capacity to distinguish between right and wrong" to
determine competence to stand trial); State v. Bethune, 71 S.E. 29, 32 (S.C. 1911) (erroneously
describing incompetence to stand trial as an affirmative defense).
18. Compare, e.g., Freeman, 4 Denio at 20 (stating that "[t]he true reason why an insane
person should not be tried, is that he is disabled by an act of God to make a just defense if he have
one") with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367 (West 1982) (providing that "[a] defendant is mentally incom-
petent if.. . the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to
assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner"). By contrast, the standard for the
insanity defense has evolved considerably. See, e.g. Barbara A. Weiner, Mental Disability and the
Criminal Law, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 693, 707 (3d
ed. 1985); David L. Bazelon, Psychiatrists and the Adversary Process, Scr. AM. June, 1974, at 18.
19. 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Because the Court was interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (currently codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1988)), Dusky applies only to federal cases.
20. Although Dusky petitioned for certiorari, the Solicitor General apparently did not oppose
the petition, and had argued that "the record in this case does not sufficiently support the findings
of competency to stand trial." Id. at 402 (quoting from the Solicitor General's brief). The Court
also endorsed the standard proposed by the Solicitor General. Id.
21. Id.
22. Project, Eighteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 77 GEo. L.J. 695, 867 (1989).
23. See DEBRA WHITCOMB & RONALD L. BRANYr, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 1 (Policy Brief
of the National Institute of Justice) (observing that every state has adopted the Dusky standard);
see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1367 (West 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 812.3 (West 1979); Wallace v.
State, 282 S.E.2d 325 (Ga. 1981).
24. Robinson, 383 U.S. at 385; Drope, 420 U.S. at 173.
25. See, e.g., Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847) (observing that the trial
court had empanelled a jury to determine the defendant's competence); Martin v. Estelle, 546 F.2d
177, 179 (5th Cir.) (stating that a separate hearing is constitutionally required so that the compe-
tency decision may be made "uncluttered by evidence of the offense itself" (quoting Townsend v.
State, 427 S.W.2d 55, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968))), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 971 (1977).
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their findings to the court, which may or may not inquire further.28
Other jurisdictions follow the common-law practice of trying the matter
to a jury.27 Still other jurisdictions permit the trial judge to decide if
the defendant is competent.2" Although the states must provide suffi-
cient procedural protection for the competency right,29 the Constitution
does not prescribe any particular method of decisionmaking.30 Compe-
tency hearings are unique among collateral proceedings, moreover, in
that they do not resolve their subject conclusively; the judge and coun-
sel are under a continuing obligation to raise the issue again if the de-
fendant becomes incompetent during the course of the trial."1
III. THE HISTORY OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN COMPETENCY
DECISIONMAKING
A. The Burden at Common Law and Today
Though the competency requirement has a long history, the burden
of proof in competency hearings appears to have become an issue only
recently. The courts' recognition of their unique responsibility to ensure
that only competent defendants are tried can be traced as far back as
1790.2 The allocation of the burden of proof appears not to have been
an issue in these early cases because courts viewed as paramount their
role in safeguarding the process. As recently as 1954, however, one trea-
tise author confidently declared the majority rule to be that because the
defendant is presumed to be competent, the defendant bears the bur-
den of proof.3
Courts were not unanimous, however, with regard to either the al-
location of the burden of proof or the amount of evidence needed to
carry that burden. Tennessee apparently placed the burden of proving
competence on the state in Jordan v. State.4 In United States v.
26. See, e.g., State v. Marks, 211 So. 2d 261, 262 n.2 (La. 1968).
27. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(f) (West 1982); Freeman, 4 Denio at 27.
28. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (1988).
29. Robinson, 383 U.S. at 378.
30. See, e.g., Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1899).
31. Drope, 420 U.S. at 181; see also Brown v. Warden, Great Meadow Correctional Facility,
682 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982).
Any discussion of competency procedures would be incomplete without noting that most com-
petency issues are not resolved through an adversarial hearing. See Mental Incompetency: Where
Should Burden of Proof Be?, NAT'L L. J. Dec. 10, 1990, at 9, 9 (observing that "for most cases, the
competency burden is merely academic," because the adversaries usually agree about the defend-
ant's competence).
32. See William T. Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in the Federal Courts: Conceptual and
Constitutional Problems, 45 U. CHL L. REv. 21, 25-27, 57 (1977).
33. HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE, 434-35 (1954).
34. 135 S.W. 327 (Tenn. 1911).
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Chisholm the Federal Circuit Court held that the defendant bore the
burden of generating a "fair, reasonable doubt" of his competence to
stand trial.3 5 Chisholm thus appeared to apply a reasonable doubt stan-
dard that was weighted in the defendant's favor, although the defend-
ant bore the burden of production. 6 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Jolley v. State37 upheld a state law38 requiring that the
defendant's competence to stand trial be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Other courts allocated the burden of proof to the party raising the
issue.39 The number of jurisdictions allocating the burden to the mo-
vant may be greater than a superficial reading of the case law indicates,
because a court that allocates the burden to the prosecution or defend-
ant in a given case may have done so because that party raised the
issue. California provides a good example. The section of the California
Penal Code which establishes that competence to stand trial is subject
to a preponderance of the evidence standard does not mention alloca-
tion of the burden of proof.40 The California Supreme Court, however,
has interpreted this to mean that the burden is on the moving party. In
re Bye 41 presented an unusual problem: the prosecutor challenged the
defendant's competence to stand trial, and persuaded the jury in the
competency hearing that, despite the defendant's wish to proceed to
trial on the minor charge, he was incompetent. The defendant argued
unsuccessfully on appeal that the preponderance standard was inade-
quate to sustain a finding of incompetence. A California court of ap-
peals upheld this law, noting that incompetence had to be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence.42 In 1990, in People v. Medina4 ' the
California Supreme Court upheld a competency finding. In Medina,
however, the court held that the defendant bore the burden of proving
35. 149 F. 284, 290 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906) (defining the burden in jury instructions).
36. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
37. 384 A.2d 91, 98 (Md. 1978); see also Ley's Case, 1 Lewin 239, 168 Eng. Rep. 1026 (1828)
(apparently applying a reasonable doubt standard).
38. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 59, § 23 (1957).
39. In Regina v. Podola, 1 Q.B. 325 (1960), the Queen's Bench upheld a jury instruction
which placed the burden of proof on the defendant, who had raised the issue.
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(f) (West 1982) provides:
(f) In a jury trial, the court shall charge the jury, instructing them on all matters of law
necessary for the rendering of a verdict. It shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally
competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is men-
tally incompetent. The verdict of the jury shall be unanimous.
41. 172 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
42. Id. at 188.
43. 799 P.2d 1282 (Cal. 1990), cert. granted, 116 L.Ed. 2d 276 (1991); See also infra part
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his incompetence.44
B. The Current Controversy
The current controversy over the allocation of the burden of proof
in competence to stand trial proceedings can be traced to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals' 1976 decision in United States v. DiGilio.45
DiGilio was charged with misappropriation of government records.
Prior to trial, DiGilio's attorney moved for a determination of DiGilio's
competence to stand trial, and DiGilio was examined at a clinic under
court order. Although DiGilio suffered from organic mental illness
brought about by trauma and was functionally retarded, the trial court
placed the burden of proof on him and found DiGilio competent to
stand trial.46 The Third Circuit reversed DiGilio's conviction, holding
that the trial court had misallocated the burden of proof.47
Although DiGilio has played a significant role in subsequent consti-
tutional decisions, 48 it is unclear whether the court pronounced a con-
stitutional holding. The DiGilio court had to allocate the burden of
proof in a case arising under a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4244, which
was silent on the issue.49 Section 4244 empowers both litigants and the
trial judge to raise the issue of the defendant's competence to stand
trial.50 At the time of the DiGilio case, there was little litigation on the
burden of proof issue under the statute.51 The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, however, had ruled on a related provision, 18
U.S.C. § 4245, which applied when questions concerning the defend-
ant's competence to stand trial arise for the first time after trial.52 The
D.C. Circuit had assumed, without deciding, that the burden is on the
government in these post-trial cases, and held that the district court's
finding of competence was not clearly erroneous.5 3 Reasoning by anal-
ogy to this sister statute, and relying on the D.C. Circuit decision, the
Third Circuit held in DiGilio that it would be anomalous to place the
burden on the defendant at trial, only to have it shift to the govern-
44. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1291-92.
45. 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
46. Id. at 986.
47. Id. at 988.
48. See infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
49. DiGilio, 538 F.2d at 986. Section 4244, interpreted in DiGilio, is currently codified at 18
U.S.C. § 4241 (1988).
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1988).
51. DiGilio, 538 F.2d at 986.
52. Id. at 987 (citing Fooks v. United States, 246 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 806 (1957)).
53. See DiGilio, 538 F.2d at 987.
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ment following trial" 4 Thus, at first glance the decision is one of statu-
tory construction.
Perhaps mindful that the dicta in the D.C. Circuit's opinion was a
slender reed on which to rely, the Third Circuit turned to constitutional
protections of the competency right to inform its opinion. The court
noted that in Pate v. Robinson55 the Supreme Court had rejected the
state's waiver argument and had concluded that it is illogical to argue
that a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial can "knowingly or
intelligently" waive his rights."6 The Third Circuit reasoned, in lan-
guage that was to resonate through subsequent decisions, that "[i]t is
equally contradictory to argue that a defendant who may be incompe-
tent should be presumed to possess sufficient intelligence that he will
be able to adduce evidence of his incompetency which might otherwise
be within his grasp. '5 7
Finally, the DiGilio court noted that the allocation of the burden of
proof is relevant primarily in cases where the evidence is in equipoise,
and that theoretically these cases are rare.5 8 The issue for the Third
Circuit became, therefore, what to do in these admittedly rare circum-
stances. Noting that the Supreme Court in Drope v. Missouri9 had an-
nounced that competence to stand trial is fundamental to the operation
of the adversarial judicial process, 60 the Third Circuit held that "what
we are determining is a rule of law, of due process dimensions, that a
defendant, about whom the evidence of competency to stand trial is in
equipoise, should or should not be tried. '61 The court concluded that
the prosecution must bear the burden of proof, and therefore must lose
when the evidence is in equipoise.62
The two arguments advanced by the Third Circuit in DiGilio, that
it is contradictory to require a possibly incompetent defendant to prove
his incompetence, and that when the evidence is in equipoise, due pro-
cess requires that courts allocate the risk of error to the prosecution,
have become familiar themes in subsequent cases. In People v. McCul-
Ium6 the Illinois Supreme Court, relying largely on the DiGilio analy-
sis, struck down a state statute that had reversed the state courts'
consistent allocation of the burden of proof to the state. The weight of
54. Id. at 988.
55. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
56. DiGilio, 538 F.2d at 988 (citing Robinson, 383 U.S. at 384).
57. Id.; see also infra part V.A.
58. DiGilio, 538 F.2d at 988.
59. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
60. DiGilio, 538 F.2d at 988.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 362 N.E.2d 307 (fI. 1977).
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authority, clearly in favor of an allocation to the defendant at least as
recently as 1954,64 began to shift.
The shift in authority continued with the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in 1982, in United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen.6 5
Bilyew was convicted of murdering a young girl. The trial followed a
competency hearing at which Bilyew bore the burden of proof under
the same statute the Illinois Supreme Court had struck down in McCul-
lum. In Bilyew's case, however, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
error in allocating the burden was harmless because the trial judge had
indicated that the burden of proof did not affect his competency deci-
sion.6 The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of
Bilyew's habeas corpus petition, and following the Third Circuit's rea-
soning in DiGilio, it held that the error could not constitutionally be
deemed harmless. 6 7 Several state court decisions continued this line of
cases: a dissenting Ohio appellate judge relied on DiGilio in State v.
Pruitt,66 as did judges writing for the majorities in cases in Delaware69
and South Dakota, 0 the South Dakota court basing its opinion on the
state constitution.
DiGilio's influence was not limited to constitutional decisions, how-
ever. In State v. Heger1 the North Dakota Supreme Court filled a gap
in a state statute, holding that the prosecution must bear the burden of
proof, because a "great injustice" would occur if the competency deci-
sion were erroneous and an incompetent defendant were put on trial. 2
Citing DiGilio, the court wrote that the majority of courts place the
burden of proof on the state."3 In Commonwealth v. Crowley 4 the Mas-
sachussetts Supreme Judicial Court similarly relied on the Third Cir-
cuit's reasoning in DiGilio to interpret an ambiguous state statute and
placed the burden of proof on the state.
Those who champion a due process right in the burden of proof in
competence to stand trial have not been unopposed. Early decisions fol-
lowing DiGilio failed to challenge it directly, however. In State v.
Pedersen75 the Iowa Supreme Court held that a new statute placed the
64. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
65. 686 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1982).
66. Id. at 1244.
67. Id. at 1246.
68. 480 N.E.2d 499, 505-06 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (opinion of Day, J.).
69. Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 863-64 (Del. 1986).
70. State v. Jones, 406 N.W.2d 366, 369 (S.D. 1987).
71. 326 N.W.2d 855, 858 (N.D. 1982).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 471 N.E.2d 353, 357-58 (Mass. 1984).
75. 309 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Iowa 1981).
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burden of proof in competency hearings on the defendant. 76 The Iowa
court's decision relied in part on the fact that an earlier statute had
made this allocation expressly, but the court also noted that since de-
fendants were presumed to be competent, they should be found compe-
tent when the evidence is in equipoise.77 The Georgia Supreme Court
similarly ignored DiGilio when it held in Wallace v. State78 that the
burden of proof is on the defendant. The Georgia court rejected the
defendant's argument that the prosecution must prove competence be-
cause of the state's burden of disproving all mitigating circumstances in
a capital case, rightly concluding that incompetence is not a mitigating
circumstance. Having clarified the difference between competence and
insanity, the court then clouded the issue again by implying that be-
cause the United States Supreme Court had upheld the constitutional-
ity of placing the burden on a defendant of proving insanity at the time
of the crime, its allocation of the burden in competency proceedings
was likewise constitutional.8 0
Although Pedersen and Wallace did not challenge directly the
Third Circuit's holding in DiGilio, the arguments the Iowa and Georgia
Supreme Courts advanced in support of their decisions are typical of
those found in subsequent cases: the presumption of competence re-
quires a finding of competence when the evidence is in equipoise; and
the United States Supreme Court's decisions upholding the allocation
of the burden of proving insanity at the time of the offense answer the
constitutional concerns about the allocation of the burden in compe-
tency proceedings.
The first direct affront to DiGilio's reasoning came in an Ohio ap-
pellate court's decision in State v. Pruitt.81 The three-judge panel split
three ways on the constitutionality of a statute that was interpreted as
76. Five years earlier, the Iowa Supreme Court had arrived at the same conclusion in a deci-
sion based on the state constitution. State v. Aumann, 265 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1978). See Roxann
M. Ryan, Comment, Should the Burden of Proving Incompetence Rest on the Incompetent?, 64
IowA L. REv. 984 (1979). The defendant conceded that he had no federal constitutional claim be-
cause he believed that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S.
877 (1976), precluded his claim. In Rivera the Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question a prisoner's claim that placing on him the burden of proving an insanity defense was
unconstitutional. See infra note 135.
77. 309 N.W.2d at 496.
78. 282 S.E.2d 325, 330 (Ga. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927 (1982).
79. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
80. Wallace, 282 S.E.2d at 330. In State v. Chapman, 721 P.2d 392, 395 (N.M. 1986), the
Supreme Court of New Mexico similarly refused the defendant's constitutional challenge to a state
law that placed the burden of proof on the defendant. The court in Chapman relied conclusively
on a pre-DiGilio decision upholding this allocation of the burden. Id. (citing State v. Ortega, 419
P.2d 219, 228 (N.M. 1966)).
81. 480 N.E.2d 499 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
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placing the burden of proving competence to stand trial on the defend-
ant. Two judges upheld the statute: one noted summarily that it was
constitutional; s2 the other, like the Supreme Court of Georgia in Wal-
lace, viewed the issue as analogous to the clearly constitutional practice
of requiring the defendant to prove insanity.83 A third judge, noting
that a simple allocation to either party results in contradictions, agreed
with the Third Circuit in DiGilio that fundamental fairness forbids the
trial of a defendant when the evidence is in equipoise.8 4
The dissension reached the Federal Courts of Appeals with the
Fifth Circuit's 1987 decision in Lowenfield v. Phelps.8 5 In Lowenfield
the defendant challenged his murder conviction on the grounds that he
had been unconstitutionally required to carry the burden of proof at his
competency hearing. The Fifth Circuit criticized the Seventh Circuit for
extending DiGilio to the states in the Bilyew decision. Noting that no
other circuit court of appeals had chosen to follow Bilyew, the Fifth
Circuit refused to follow it for three reasons. According to the Fifth
Circuit, the Bilyew court had adopted without analysis the Illinois Su-
preme Court's conclusion in McCullum that it is unconstitutional to
place the burden on the defendant. Moreover, Bilyew had confused the
restrictions placed on federal prosecutors with the wide latitude given
to state legislatures. Despite DiGilio's language announcing a rule of
"due process dimensions, 86 the Fifth Circuit limited the holding in
that case to the federal statute under which it arose. Finally, the Fifth
Circuit held that even if the Seventh Circuit were correct and it is un-
constitutional to place the burden of proof on the defendant, the error
in Lowenfield's case was harmless since there was no reasonable
probability that a different allocation of the burden would have re-
sulted in a finding that he had been incompetent to stand trial.87
Over the past decade and a half, the weight of authority, which
previously had upheld the constitutionality of allocating the burden of
proof to the defendant, 8 has been called into question. Although sev-
eral states had upheld the constitutionality of this choice at the time of
Lowenfield, no state court had fully answered the constitutional con-
cerns that the Third Circuit raised in DiGilio and that the Seventh Cir-
cuit enforced against Illinois in Bilyew. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit's
82. Id. at 509 (opinion of Nahra, J.).
83. Id. at 509 (opinion of Markus, J.).
84. Id. at 506 (Day, J., dissenting in part).
85. 817 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
86. United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 988 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977).
87. Lowenfield, 817 F.2d at 295.
88. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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disposition of Lowenfield-holding that regardless of the burden of
proof, any error had been harmless-meant that the facts and posture
of that case rendered the burden of proof issue less salient than the
court's rhetoric suggested. Onto this confused stage strode Teofilo Me-
dina. In People v. Medina 9 the California Supreme Court held that
placing the burden of proof in competency hearings on the defendant is
constitutional.
C. People v. Medina
The facts of Medina illustrate the difficult choices courts must
make in competency proceedings. Teofilo Medina spent most of his life
in prison following one conviction for firing a gun in a crowded restau-
rant and another for rape and kidnapping.90 After serving time in the
Arizona State Prison for the latter conviction, Medina was paroled in
1984. Despite his long history of committing violent crimes, when Me-
dina was paroled he appeared to have a good chance at life outside
prison. One of his sisters offered to have him live with her family, and
another gave him a car. With a new identity, Medina stayed in touch
with parole authorities for two months following his release. His success
outside was short-lived, however, and ended when he was arrested fol-
lowing a "rampage" which left in its wake four convenience store clerks
killed execution-style, a woman raped, and another woman the victim
of a violent assault. He was subsequently charged with three of the
murders."1
Medina's behavior following his arrest raised serious doubts about
his competence to stand trial. While at the county jail awaiting trial, he
was disciplined for destroying a television set and threatening depu-
ties.2 He was stabbed while emerging from a shower room, and was
placed in a padded cell after he twice tried to kill himself.9 3 While talk-
ing with his defense attorney, Medina slashed his own throat with a
razor blade he had hidden in a matchbook, but he recovered from the
superficial wound. 4
To determine Medina's competence to stand trial, two court-ap-
pointed experts and a psychiatrist selected by his defense counsel ex-
89. 799 P.2d at 1282 (Cal. 1990), cert. granted, 116 L.Ed. 2d 276 (1991).
90. Lengthy Trial Expected for Parolee Charged in 3 Execution-Style Killings, LA TIMES,
June 30, 1986, at part 2, p. 1, col. 4.
91. Id.
92. Psychologist Says Murder Suspect Fit for Trial, Though Schizophrenic, LA TIMES,
July 18, 1986, at part 2, p. 5, col. 4 [hereinafter Fit for Trial].
93. Id.
94. Id.; Medina, 799 P.2d at 1288; Murder Suspect Tries to Slash Own Throat, LA TIMs,
July 12, 1986, at part 2, p. 2, col. 2.
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amined Medina.95 Medina behaved erratically during these interviews.
During one interview with a court-appointed doctor, Medina broke the
glass partition separating them;8 he told another that he heard his
dead brother's voice and that he saw Jesus and Saint John. Medina
told another doctor that he saw himself as a "warlock, or a high priest,
someone who has been in collaboration with Satan.' " 8 Nevertheless,
both court-appointed experts concluded that Medina was competent to
stand trial.9  Testimony from the jail psychiatrist supported a finding of
competence. The defense's psychiatrist, who had known Medina while
he was imprisoned in Arizona, concluded that Medina was incompetent.
During the competency hearing, Medina disrupted the proceedings with
several outbursts, kicked over the defense table, and refused to come
out of a holding cell following a break because of the presence of a news
photographer. Despite this behavior and the testimony of the defense
psychiatrist, the jury empanelled to hear the issue found him compe-
tent to stand trial. 00 Because of his outburst during the competency
hearing, Medina was shackled throughout the remainder of the
proceedings.10'
Medina appealed his subsequent conviction, arguing that the state
court unconstitutionally had required him to bear the burden of proof
in his competency hearing. 10 2 Rejecting this challenge, the California
Supreme Court held that placing the burden of proof on the defendant
did not violate the requirements of due process. 03
The majority relied principally on the argument, first advanced in
the DiGilio era by the Georgia Supreme Court in Wallace v. State,'04
that the burden of proof in competency determinations is analogous to
the burden of proving an insanity defense. The California Supreme
Court reasoned that because the United States Supreme Court had up-
held the allocation to the defendant of the burden of proving insanity
in Leland v. Oregon, 10 making the defendant bear the burden of prov-
ing incompetence is likewise constitutional. The California court read
Leland broadly, noting that, like insanity, competence was not an ele-
95. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1288; Fit for Trial, supra note 92.
96. Fit for Trial, supra note 92.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1288; Fit for Trial, supra note 92.
100. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1288; Medina Judged Competent to Stand Trial in 3 Killings, LA.
TmEs, July 23, 1986, at part 2, p. 7, col. 1.
101. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1299.
102. Id. at 1288-89.
103. Id. at 1292.
104. 282 S.E.2d 325, 330 (Ga. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927 (1982); see supra notes 78-80
and accompanying text.
105. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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ment of the crime charged, 10 6 and relied on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
in Lowenfield v. Phelps"0 7 that the states have great latitude in allocat-
ing the burden of proof.
The Medina majority also noted that the availability of relevant
evidence to each side is an important factor in allocating the burden of
proof.08 In Morrison v. California'0 9 the United States Supreme Court
had established a rule weighing the convenience to the parties and op-
portunity for knowledge concerning the fact to be proved against the
potential hardship and oppression to the defendant. Applying the prin-
ciples in Morrison to Medina's case, the California Supreme Court held
that the defendant and his counsel would probably have better access
to the facts relevant to the court's competency inquiry than the state
would. 110 In response to the Seventh Circuit's concern in Bilyew that an
incompetent defendant would be unable to cooperate with his coun-
sel,"' the California court observed that the defendant's attorney could
attest to this fact, while the prosecution would not see the defendant's
inability to cooperate with counsel." 2
The majority concluded its opinion on the competency issue by re-
jecting the defendant's challenge to the operation of the presumption of
competence." 3 Medina argued that the presumption should drop out of
the case once a legitimate doubt regarding competence arises. The ma-
jority disagreed, observing that the presumption's primary role is to
"place on defendant (or the People, if they contest his competence) the
burden of rebutting it. 1" 4 According to the majority, the presumption
remains in effect throughout the case.
In dissent Justice Mosk argued that because the due process clause
requires the court to determine mental competence, the prosecution
must bear the burden of proving competence beyond a reasonable
106. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1290.
107. 817 F.2d 285, 294 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 484 U.S. 231 (1988); see supra
notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
108. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1291.
109. 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
110. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1291.
111. United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen, 686 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1982); see supra note 67
and accompanying text.
112. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1291; see also Justices Rule on Competency; State Court: They
Affirm the Constitutionality of a Law That Places the Burden of Proving Mental Incapability on
the Defense, LA TIMES, Nov. 20, 1990, at part A, p. 3, col. 2 (citing California Deputy Attorney
General Jay M. Bloom, who indicated that proving the quality of the attorney-client relationship
would be difficult for the state because of the attorney-client privilege).
113. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1291-92.
114. Id. at 1291. This statement suggests that the rule in California is that the burden is on
the moving party. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
1991]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
doubt.115 Although he agreed with the majority that a defendant's com-
petence to stand trial is not an element of the crime, Justice Mosk ar-
gued that because due process requires both competence to stand trial
and that the elements of the crime be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt "[b]y parity of reasoning, it bars conviction except on proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution that the defendant is in
fact mentally competent. 11. 6
In a separate dissent Justice Broussard joined the battle with the
majority using the arguments which were established in DiGilio and ex-
tended to the states in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bilyew. 117 Jus-
tice Broussard noted that DiGilio cited two arguments against placing
the burden of proof on a defendant of questionable competence: first,
requiring a possibly incompetent defendant to prove his own incompe-
tence is contradictory; and second, due process requires that when the
evidence is in equipoise, the defendant must not be tried.
Justice Broussard went further than preceding cases had,'"" how-
ever, and specifically rebutted the majority's reliance on Leland v. Ore-
gon for the proposition that because the United States Supreme Court
upheld placing the burden of proving insanity on the defendant, the
allocation of the burden to the defendant in a competency hearing like-
wise is constitutional." 9 Justice Broussard identified two flaws in the
majority's use of Leland. First, the insanity defense cases are inapposite
because the opportunity to advance an insanity defense presupposes
that the defendant is competent to stand trial. Justice Broussard noted
that although competence is not an element of the crime, the law re-
quires that the prosecution bear the burden on other matters not in-
volving an element, such as the voluntariness of a confession, and that
the crime was committed within the limitations period. 20 Second, Le-
land and its progeny fail to address DiGilio's second concern-that the
risk of error is too great to permit trial of a defendant when the evi-
dence of competence is no greater than that of incompetence.' 2' Noting
that the United States Supreme Court had refused to recognize waiver
of the competence right in Pate v. Robinson and Drope v. Missouri,22
115. Id. at 1310-11 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1311.
117. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
118. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1313 (Broussard, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. DiGilio, 538
F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen,
686 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1982).
119. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1313.
120. Id. at 1313-14.
121. Id. at 1314.
122. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); see
also supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
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Justice Broussard argued that evidence of competence must outweigh
evidence of incompetence. 11 3 He responded to the majority's argument
that convenience and opportunity for knowledge permit the allocation
of the burden to the defendant by distinguishing the burden of produc-
tion from the burden of persuasion; while the burden of production
may be shifted to the defendant, due process dictates that the burden
of persuasion remain with the state.'24
Medina is the first case to join all of the arguments regarding the
allocation of the burden of proof in competency determinations. Al-
though the majority and dissenting opinions in Medina are well-rea-
soned, much of the rhetoric concerning the relationship between the
due process clause and the burden of proof in competency proceedings
merely confuses the issue. This deadwood must be pruned away before
one can undertake a proper due process analysis.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT THE
STATE MUST BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Leland v. Oregon and the Constitutionality of Requiring the
Defendant to Prove Nonelemental Matters
1. Leland v. Oregon
In Leland v. Oregon125 the United States Supreme Court held that
it was constitutionally permissible for Oregon to require that criminal
defendants bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
they were insane at the time of the offense. In Davis v. United States 26
the Supreme Court had held that the federal government bore the bur-
den of disproving insanity. Leland challenged his murder conviction on
the grounds that an old state statute, which placed the burden of proof
on the defendant, was unconstitutional under Davis.27 Justice Clark,
writing for the Court, observed that the burden of proving insanity had
been placed on the defendant historically, and that at trial, the issue
arose only after the prosecution had proved all elements of the offense
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.' 28 The Court refused to extend Da-
vis to the states, noting that it "establishe[d] no constitutional doc-
123. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1315.
124. Id. at 1316.
125. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
126. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
127. Leland, 343 U.S. at 793. When Leland was decided in 1952, Oregon was the only state
that required a defendant to prove an insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 798.
128. Id. at 797, 799.
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trine." The Court upheld the Oregon rule, finding that it did not violate
generally accepted concepts of basic standards of justice.12
The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur'30
appeared to question Leland's rule of deference to the states in defining
their criminal law. In Wilbur the defendant challenged his murder con-
viction on the grounds that a Maine statute unconstitutionally allocated
to the defendant the burden of proving that the crime occurred in the
heat of passion. The Supreme Court agreed.' 3 ' Although it was bound
by the state's definition of the crime of homicide, the Court refused to
elevate form over substance; because whether the defendant acted in
the heat of passion was a critical question in determining the degree of
punishment under Maine's relatively simple homicide statute, the pros-
ecution must bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion. 3 2 Justice Rehn-
quist, concurring in the decision, argued that Leland was distinguisha-
ble from Wilbur: Maine's redefinition of homicide in the latter case
"effect[ed] an unconstitutional shift in the State's traditional burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all necessary elements of the
offense." 33
A year later in Rivera v. Delaware,'3' the Supreme Court held that
a challenge similar to that in Leland did not present a substantial fed-
eral question, dismissing both the case and any question that Wilbur
had signalled the downfall of Leland.' Justice Brennan, joined by Jus-
tice Marshall, dissented from the dismissal, arguing that despite its de-
cision in Wilbur, the Court continued to exalt form over substance.
"[T]he plea of insanity, whether or not the State chooses to character-
ize it as an affirmative defense, relates to the accused's state of mind, an
essential element of the crime, and bears upon the appropriate form of
punishment.' ' 36 Since Rivera, the Supreme Court consistently has per-
mitted states to define the elements and procedures of affirmative
129. Id. at 799 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
130. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
131. Id. at 103-04.
132. Id. at 697-98.
133. Id. at 706 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
134. 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
135. Interestingly, the defendant in State v. Aumann, 265 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1978), appar-
ently believed that Rivera precluded his federal constitutional claim concerning the allocation of
the burden of proof in competency hearings. Id. at 319. The Supreme Court's recent grant of
certiorari in Medina v. California, 116 L.Ed. 2d 276 (1991), on this very issue indicates that in fact
there is a substantial federal question, even if the answer to it is that the Constitution does not
prescribe the burden of proof (contrary to this Note's conclusion). See also Comment, supra note
76, at 994 (criticizing the Iowa Supreme Court's reliance on Rivera in Aumann).
136. Rivera, 429 U.S. at 880 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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defenses. 37
2. The Leland Argument in the Competency Controversy
Several courts have concluded that Leland's holding with regard to
the insanity defense is apposite to the burden of proof in competency
decisionmaking"'3 This argument has some merit, but it has been
greatly overextended, and the opinions often have left in doubt the ba-
sis for the analogy to competency hearings.
Courts that rely on Leland to uphold the placement of the burden
of proving competence on the defendant argue that Leland implicitly
holds that states may cast onto the defendant the burden of proving
any issue not comprising an element of the offense.13 9 In the view of
these courts, Leland extends constitutional protection to the burden of
proving only those issues that are elements of the offense, although
Wilbur suggests that states may not disingenuously redefine their crim-
inal law to avoid protecting this right. According to these courts, since
competence to stand trial is not an element of the crime charged, states
possess broad discretion in establishing procedures for competency
decisionmaking.
These courts' reliance on Leland is unjustified. 40 Their reading of
Leland is essentially one in which state powers are defined in negative
137. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (upholding an Ohio statute allocating the burden of
proving self-defense to the defendant); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (upholding a
New York law that required the defendant to prove a defense of extreme emotional disturbance in
order to reduce a second-degree murder charge to one of manslaughter); see also Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (doubting that due process requires a state to
provide an insanity defense); People v. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1282, 1290 (Cal. 1990) (describing this
trend), cert. granted, 116 L.Ed. 2d 276 (1991).
138. See, e.g., People v. Medina, 799 P.2d 1282, 1290-91 (Cal. 1990), cert. granted, 116 L.Ed.
2d 276 (1991); see also supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Medina, 799 P.2d at 1290; Wallace v. State, 282 S.E.2d 325, 330 (Ga. 1981)
(citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), which followed Leland); see also Comment,
supra note 76, at 996; supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
140. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1313-14 (Broussard, J., dissenting); see also Comment, supra note
76, at 996 (criticizing the Iowa Supreme Court's reliance on Leland in State v. Aumann, 265
N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1978)); supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
The most obvious criticism of this argument is that it confuses the issues of competence to
stand trial and insanity at the time of the crime and ignores the fact that in order to assert an
insanity defense, a defendant must be competent to stand trial. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1313 (Brous-
sard, J. dissenting) (observing that "[iun the insanity context, a rule placing the burden of proof of
insanity on the defendant imposes that burden on a defendant who, by necessity, must have al-
ready been found to be presently competent to assist in his own defense"). This is similar to an
argument the Third Circuit first advanced in DiGilio-that it is contradictory to require a possibly
incompetent defendant to prove his incompetence. United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 988 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); see also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
These two closely related arguments are susceptible to the same criticisms, and this Note discusses
them in the context of the other arguments advanced to support a due process requirement that
the prosecutor shoulder the burden of proving competence. See infra part V.
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terms-all issues that are nonelemental are within the state's discre-
tion. As Justice Mosk noted in his Medina dissent, although states have
broad discretion to define criminal offenses and defenses, this discretion
may not operate to deprive a defendant of a constitutional right.""' The
courts relying on Leland fail to recognize that there are issues which are
neither elements of the crime nor discretionary, such as constitutionally
prescribed procedural protections. States' freedom to design their crim-
inal law is limited to the definition of crimes and affirmative defenses
and should not be extended to the definition of procedures necessary to
ensure fundamental rights. Since competence to stand trial is a funda-
mental due process right, cases such as Leland-in which a state allo-
cates the burden of proving facts necessary to establish an entitlement
to a substantive statutory right-are inapposite. 142
By relying on decisions which do not address the concern that state
procedures must be adequate to protect a constitutional right, the deci-
sions opposing DiGilio fail to demonstrate conclusively that the result
in DiGilio is not mandated by the Constitution, and they serve only to
confuse due process jurisprudence.
B. Burdens of Proof, Convenience, and Morrison v. California
1. Burdens of Proof
Because competence to stand trial is a prerequisite to participation
in our adversarial system of criminal justice, the process of formally
proving competence stretches the legal system's adversarial framework,
including the concepts of burden of proof and presumption. A thorough
analysis demonstrates that in competency hearings, these concepts ulti-
mately fail to achieve their primary purpose of guiding decisionmakers.
The courts nevertheless have concentrated on the roles of these two
concepts in defining competency jurisprudence.
The roles that the burden of proof plays in competency hearings
define the constitutional implications of that burden for the defendant.
The meaning of the phrase "burden of proof," however, is obscure.
Many courts and scholars have searched in vain for universal principles
to govern the analysis of the effects of burdens of proof and of pre-
sumptions, yet the field remains a dense thicket.43 Despite the patent
need for a common understanding of how these rules operate, the judi-
cial opinions fail to discuss, or even to recognize, the differences among
141. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1311 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342 (Edward W. Cleary, ed., 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter Mc-
CORMICK] (stating that "[o]ne ventures the assertion that 'presumption' is the slipperiest member
of the family of legal terms, except its first cousin, 'burden of proof' ").
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jurisdictions.
The phrase "burden of proof" can refer either to the burden of pro-
ducing evidence or to the burden of persuading the factfinder.'4 The
burden of production typically is considered satisfied when the bur-
dened party produces enough evidence to make the issue one of fact for
the jury.145 The burden of persuasion, on the other hand, operates at
the moment of decision, and is satisfied when enough evidence has been
introduced to satisfy the standard of persuasion. 146 These two concepts
are characterized by their weight-the evidentiary quantity the party
bearing the burden must satisfy-and their allocation-the identifica-
tion of which party bears the burden. 41
The absence of directed verdict standards in competency hearings
restricts the role of the burden of proof. The principal distinction be-
tween the burden of production and the burden of persuasion in most
proceedings is that a party's failure to meet the burden of production
results in a directed verdict. 14 There is no directed verdict standard in
competency hearings, however. Once a bona fide doubt has triggered
the hearing process, the burden of production has no meaning, and the
sole effect of the burden of proof is to allocate the ultimate burden of
persuasion. 49
Presumptions generally are defined as rules which permit or man-
date the inference of one fact (the fact presumed) from the proof of
another (the fact proved). 50 This traditional understanding affects the
role presumptions play in decisionmaking. Some authorities hold that
presumptions shift both the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion on the issue.' 5' This appears to conform to the view of
courts that place the burden of persuasion in competency hearings on
the defendant on the grounds that the law presumes a defendant to be
144. Id. at § 336.
145. Id. at § 338.
146. Id. at §§ 339-41.
147. See Underwood, supra note 7, at 1300.
148. MCCORMICK, supra note 143, at § 336.
149. Occasionally, a court may provide a competency hearing upon evidence that fails to
satisfy the bona fide doubt standard, and the presumption of competence may act as a de facto
directed verdict standard. Once satisfied, however, the presumption should cease to operate.
150. Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Pro-
cess in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1969); McCoRMICK, supra
note 143, at § 342.
151. EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE (1954). Morgan's approach directly
contradicts the "Bursting Bubble" theory of Thayer which dominates American law on presump-
tions. See JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (1896). A
detailed explication of these contrasting approaches is beyond the scope of this Note because the
presumption of competence is not a true presumption covered by either approach. See infra notes
155-56 and accompanying text. See generally Ashford & Risinger, supra note 150, at 169; McCoR-
MICK, supra note 143, at § 344, p. 980.
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competent.152 In People v. Medina153 the California Supreme Court rat-
ified this view, and rejected the defendant's contention that the pre-
sumption should cease to operate after a doubt arises about the
defendant's competence' 154 The California court's description of the
presumption of competence essentially restates the burden of proof: the
primary role of the presumption is to place upon the defendant the bur-
den of rebutting it.
Unfortunately, the presumption of competence is not really a pre-
sumption. Under the traditional definition-a rule which permits the
inference of one fact from the proof of another-the presumption of
competence, like the presumption of innocence, is misnamed. 5 5 There
is no fact presumed and so there can be no logical inference. True pre-
sumptions prescribe a rule which might be paraphrased: "If A is
proved, then you may (or must, in the case of a mandatory presump-
tion) infer that B is true." But the presumption of competence may be
paraphrased: "You may (or must) believe that the defendant is compe-
tent." The presumption of competence is really a substantive rule of
law which permits trials to proceed in the absence of contradictory evi-
dence, and allocates the initial burden of production to the party chal-
lenging competence. 56
Despite the apparent simplicity of the Medina court's holding, it is
difficult to reconcile its interpretation with the constitutional require-
ments the United States Supreme Court announced in Drope v. Mis-
souri and Pate v. Robinson.157 Those cases establish that once there is a
bona fide doubt raised about the defendant's competence, the trial
judge must conduct a separate competency hearing. 58 The presumption
of competence permits trials to go forward in the absence of such a
doubt. The Supreme Court has not addressed the presumption's role in
152. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
153. 799 P.2d 1282 (Cal. 1990), cert. granted, 116 L.Ed. 2d 276 (1991); see also supra part
II.C.
154. 799 P.2d at 1291. Medina's argument essentially is that the "Bursting Bubble" analysis
of presumptions should obtain. See supra note 151.
155. See MCCORMICK, supra note 143 at § 340, pp. 967-68.
156. Ashford and Risinger argue that the presumption of sanity (i.e., at the time of the of-
fense) consists of a presumptiori, which allocates to the defendant the burden of production, and
an assumption, which in their terminology is the assignment of the burden of persuasion to the
prosecution. Ashford & Risinger, supra note 150, at 171-74. Under their approach, the presump-
tion of competence arguably is a true presumption because it assigns the burden of production.
But as described below, see infra note 159 and accompanying text, this assignment is to all actors
in the process. Thus, even under their approach, the presumption of competence is not truly a
presumption.
157. 420 U.S 162 (1975); 383 U.S. 375 (1966); see also supra notes 8-15 and accompanying
text.
158. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
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the competency hearing itself.
Maintaining as separate doctrines the presumption of competence
and the burden of proof in competency hearings is counterproductive
and confusing. The principal danger is that courts-like the California
Supreme Court in People v. Medina-will mistake the presumption of
competence for a true presumption and, by applying divergent state ev-
idence law,159 will accord the presumption too much weight. Due pro-
cess requires that states provide procedures sufficient to protect the
right to competence, and courts should not permit erosion of this pro-
tection by the idiosyncratic interpretation of a facially universal rule.
Even if assigning the burden of proof to the defendant is constitution-
ally permissible, and states are permitted to retain the presumption of
competence as a policy' that justifies the burden of proof allocation,
they should not be permitted to ascribe evidentiary weight to it as well.
Like the "presumption" of competence, the "burden of proof" in
competency decisionmaking is misnamed. The Supreme Court has es-
tablished the threshold level of evidence for triggering the competency
decisionmaking process. In doing so, the Court not only decided the
weight of the initial burden of production-a bona fide doubt about the
defendant's competence-but also distributed the burden of production
among the actors in the adversarial system. This "burden" might be
better described as an obligation that the actors owe to the process it-
self. The adversarial terminology and precepts thus break down in com-
petency hearings. At these limits of adversarial justice, courts should be
chary of imposing adversarial requirements and should fall back on
their obligation to discover the truth before proceeding to trial.160
Courts should play an active role in the competency decisionmaking
process, and should seek out additional evidence if that presented by
the state and the defense fails to produce a clear result.
Despite its inaccuracy, courts are likely to rely on the old terminol-
ogy. Courts must nevertheless consider that in competency decision-
making, these concepts do not have their usual effects. The burden of
production is attenuated by the requirements of due process. The sole
effect of the presumption of competence is to allocate the burden of
persuasion, and it is this allocation that must conform to due process.
In People v. Medina'61 the California Supreme Court justified its allo-
cation of the burden of persuasion on the basis of convenience and op-
portunity for knowledge.
159. See MCCORMICK, supra note 143, at § 344 (describing presumptions in civil cases).
160. See Pizzi, supra note 32, at 57.
161. 799 P.2d 1282 (Cal. 1990), cert. granted, 116 L.Ed. 2d 276 (1991); see supra part I1I.C.
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2. The Convenience Argument
Courts and legislatures allocate the burden of proof to a particular
party for many different reasons, including policy, probability, and con-
venience.162 Courts may place the burden on the party that has a pecu-
liar opportunity for knowledge of the evidence.16 3 Similarly, the courts
may place the burden on the party seeking to demonstrate something
that is improbable.16 4 In Morrison v. California16 5 a defendant charged
with selling real property to a Japanese national challenged the validity
of a statute that shifted the burden of proving citizenship to the de-
fendant when the government proved that real property was used or
occupied by an ineligible alien. 66 Justice Cardozo, writing for the
Court, observed:
The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason and fairness the burden of
proof may be lifted from the state in criminal prosecutions and cast on a defend-
ant. The limits are in substance these, that the state shall have proved enough to
make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been proved with
excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the
opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to
the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression. 167
The California Supreme Court in People v. Medina66 relied on Morri-
son in upholding the allocation of the burden of proof to the defendant,
concluding that the defendant might have better access to the facts
than would the prosecution.16 9 Whether it is or is not constitutional to
place on the defendant the burden of proving competence, the conve-
nience argument is flawed both in its premises and in its use of the case
law.
The underlying premise of the convenience argument-that the de-
fendant has greater access to evidence of his competence-ignores the
context in which competency decisions are made. Certainly evidence
concerning the attorney-client relationship, which makes up one prong
of the Dusky standard,17 0 is more likely to be available to the defendant
than to the prosecution. A brief survey of the reported decisions, how-
ever, indicates that testimony regarding this relationship frequently is
162. MCCORaICK, supra note 143, at § 337.
163. Underwood, supra note 7, at 1335 (observing that this is the rule in federal courts and
some states, but noting that the burden of persuasion does not shift because of this rule).
164. Id. at 1336-38.
165. 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
166. Id. at 84 (describing § 9a of California's Alien Land Law).
167. Id. at 88-89.
168. 799 P.2d 1282 (Cal. 1990), cert. granted, 116 L.Ed. 2d 276 (1991).
169. Id. at 1291.
170. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (describing this part of the test as
"'whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding' ").
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not determinative; the testimony of experts, family, and those associ-
ated with the defendant during pretrial detention often carries more
weight.17 1 The defendant does not have exclusive access to information
from these other sources. While it may be easier for the defendant to
obtain cooperation from family members, the prosecution is better posi-
tioned to obtain evidence from jailers and fellow prisoners. Neither side
possesses an advantage over the other in obtaining expert testimony.172
Thus, the Medina court's conclusion that the defendant has better ac-
cess to information probative of competence is empirically suspect. 73
The California Supreme Court's reliance on Morrison is also incor-
rect. First, Morrison's convenience standard was substantially under-
mined by Tot v. United States, 4 where the United States Supreme
Court held that the convenience standard was merely a corollary to the
rational connection test it announced. 7 5 Second, although the rational
connection test has not survived either, ' 7  an examination of the rela-
tionship between the fact proved and the fact presumed is fundamental
to all of the Court's jurisprudence in the area of presumptions. 77 But
the presumption of competence-which is not a true presump-
tion'7 5-cannot be measured against these standards. Morrison, Tot,
and subsequent Supreme Court cases in this area simply are inapposite
to the presumption of competence.
Finally, the convenience argument is most compelling as a justifica-
tion for shifting the burden of production; yet the lack of a competency
analogue to the directed verdict standard renders the burden of produc-
171. See, e.g., United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming a district
court's finding of competence although the district judge had placed "primary emphasis" on the
composite testimony of lay witnesses, and had not credited medical testimony); Wallace v. State,
282 S.E.2d 325 (Ga. 1981) (affirming a competency finding although the lay witnesses testifying
that the defendant was competent were opposed by three psychiatrists); Young v. Smith, 505 P.2d
824 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (affirming a competency finding although the lay witnesses testifying
that the defendant was competent were opposed by three psychiatrists).
172. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(a) (West 1982) (requiring the court to appoint one
psychiatrist or psychologistto examine the defendant, and two if the defendant asserts his compe-
tence); 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) (1988) (authorizing the court to order psychiatric examinations).
173. But see Pizzi, supra note 32, at 56 (arguing that prosecutors' limited access to evidence
makes the DiGilio holding untenable).
174. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
175. Id.; see also McCORMIcK, supra note 143, at § 347. Under Tot's test, a presumption is
constitutional if there is a "rational connection" between the fact proved and the fact presumed.
Tot, 319 U.S. at 467. The test forbade arbitrary presumptions. Id.
176. In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the Court required more than a merely
rational connection: it required that the presumed fact "is more likely than not to flow from the
proved fact on which it is made to depend." Id. at 36.
177. Compare, for example, the Tot rational connection test, supra note 175, with the Leary
"more likely than not" standard, supra note 176.
178. The presumption of competence is not a true presumption because there is no inference
drawn from a proven fact. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
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tion indistinguishable from the burden of persuasion.1"9 Moreover, con-
venience cannot possibly be the true reason for California's rule: the
court implicitly affirmed that the burden is really on the movant,5 0 but,
even when the prosecution moves for a competency hearing, the defend-
ant retains his supposed advantages in convenience and opportunity for
knowledge.' 8 Clearly, convenience can justify the allocation of the bur-
den to the defendant only when he is the movant; therefore, California
cannot logically claim that convenience alone justifies its allocation.
V. ARGUMENTS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT THE STATE
MUST BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROOF
The major arguments in favor of a due process right in the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof have changed little since the Third Circuit
first identified and advanced them in 1976.182 The first-the contradic-
tion argument-is that it is contradictory to require a possibly incom-
petent defendant to prove his own incompetence.'83 The second-the
equipoise argument-is that the burden of proof using a preponderance
standard is dispositive only when the evidence is in equipoise, and that
in such a case due process requires that the defendant not be tried.1 84
Like the arguments opposing them, these arguments too often have
been overextended and framed confusedly. In order to understand
properly the genuine constitutional issues, one must first discard those
which are merely makeweight.
A. United States v. DiGilio's Contradiction Argument
The premise of the contradiction argument is that a defendant's
possible incompetence handicaps her for participation in the compe-
tency decisionmaking process. The argument confuses a real constitu-
tional right-the right to be competent to stand trialls5 -with an
illusory one-the right to be competent to undergo a competency hear-
ing. Simply put, the law has never assumed that any degree of mental
competence is necessary in a competency hearing. Although it failed to
explain fully this inherent tension in the contradiction argument, the
majority in People v. Medina sensed it, observing that an incompetent
179. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
180. Medina, 799 P.2d at 1291; see also supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
181. See also In re Bye, 172 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding the statute in a
case in which the prosecutor bore the burden of proof).
182. United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977);
see also supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
183. DiGili, 538 F.2d at 988; see also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
184. DiGilio, 538 F.2d at 988; see also supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
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defendant's inability to assist his attorney could be used as evidence of
incompetence. 18 6
There are several troubling consequences to the contradiction argu-
ment. Taken to its logical end, it leads to a recursive definition of com-
petence that would deprive the legal system of its ability to make any
competency determination at all. If the defendant must possess some
competence to have his competence determined, then competency-hear-
ing competence cannot be presumed once a bona fide doubt regarding
competence to stand trial has been raised. Would a hearing be neces-
sary to determine this hearing competence? If so, what level of compe-
tence is required for participation in such a hearing? The proponents of
the contradiction argument cut short this infinite regression by stating
summarily that to counteract the defendant's possible incompetence,
the scales should be weighted in favor of a finding of incompetence. 187
Although this proposition relieves some tension, the contradiction argu-
ment remains untenable because it is premised on the belief that the
more incompetent a defendant is, the less able he is to prove it. 8 ' This
premise is counterintuitive. The greater the defendant's incompetence,
the more readily available evidence of incompetence should be.
The contradiction argument also ignores the history and purposes
of the competency requirement.8 9 The requirement arose at a time
when self-representation was the norm, not the exception. An incompe-
tent defendant at common law was, therefore, handicapped by the legal
process to an extent unimaginable today. 90 Although sometimes justi-
fied by concern for the dignity of the legal process,' 9e competence has
always been expressed in functional terms, reflecting a pragmatic con-
cern for fairness to the defendant.. 2 The proponents of the contradic-
tion argument, however, conspicuously fail to identify the capabilities
lacking in an incompetent defendant that handicap him for participa-
tion in competency hearings and that require solicitude under the due
186. 799 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Cal. 1990), cert. granted, 116 L.Ed. 2d 276 (1991).
187. See, e.g., DiGilio, 538 F.2d at 988 (holding-that "there is no room for a rule of law
placing any burden of proof on the defendant").
188. See, e.g., Medina, 799 P.2d at 1312 (Broussard, J. dissenting) (stating that it is basically
unfair to place "the burden of proof on a defendant whose incompetence, if actually present, will
impair his ability to adequately assist in the task of meeting his burden of proof").
189. See supra part II.
190. See Winick, supra note 2, at 952-53. The law's solicitude is manifest not only in the
competency requirement, but also in the rule that the defendant must be represented at a compe-
tency hearing. See, e.g., State v. Pedersen, 309 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Iowa 1981). On a related issue,
the United States Supreme Court observed in Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954), that the
competence needed to stand trial pro se may be greater than that required to stand trial with the
assistance of counsel.
191. See supra note 5.
192. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
1991] 225
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
process clause.
A review of the competency decisionmaking process reveals that
the defendant's cooperation is of minimal significance in gathering and
presenting evidence. Defendants usually are examined by mental health
professionals who testify at the competency hearing, as do attorneys,
cellmates, jail staff, family members, and friends. 193 When the defend-
ant testifies at all, it is for the purpose of determining his understand-
ing of the proceedings and ability to consult with his attorney. Those
capabilities commonly associated with competence-for example, the
ability to consult with defense counsel, to provide facts concerning ali-
bis, background information with which witnesses may be located or
impeached-are largely irrelevant in competency hearings.19 4 The com-
mon law sequestered competency decisionmaking in a process that
lacks competence as a prerequisite; the defendant need not be compe-
tent to participate in this process. While judicial concern for the hard-
ships an incompetent defendant faces is commendable and appropriate,
a rule of constitutional proportions can be justified only by a rational
analysis of those hardships.
B. Due Process, Social Values, and United States v. DiGilio's
Equipoise Argument
1. Due Process Jurisprudence and the Relevance of Social Values
The antecedents of contemporary jurisprudence regarding due pro-
cess and burdens of proof lie in the Supreme Court's 1958 decision in
Speiser v. Randall9" and its 1976 decision in Mathews v. Eldridge.96
In Speiser the Court held that the burden of proof at trial must reflect
and protect social values. Courts must reduce the risk facing the party
193. See, e.g., supra note 171 and sources cited therein.
194. The law expresses this understanding of the differing prerequisites to participation in a
trial and in a competency hearing by requiring that competency hearings must be conducted by
counsel. See, e.g., State v. Pedersen, 309 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Iowa 1981). See also supra note 190.
Permitting a defendant to conduct competency hearings pro se could give rise to a dilemma:
would a defendant who carried pro se his burden of proving his incompetence to stand trial be
considered competent to stand trial by virtue of his ability to understand and participate in the
competency hearing?
The case of Frankfort, Illinois, attorney Alan Schroeder comes very close to this situation:
Schroeder was charged in 1989 with selling cocaine to a teenager. His lawyer questioned his compe-
tence to stand trial, but Schroeder continued to practice law, and represented his clients in court.
See Attorney denied bid to practice, CHL TRm., June 13, 1991, at Sec. Du Page, p. 3. The irony
was compounded when the judge ruled that Schroeder was fit for trial, but, relying on the same
psychiatric report submitted on that issue, banned him from practicing law as a condition of his
bond. See Disciplinary Committee Bypassed: Suburban Chicago judge rules lawyer unfit for
practice, fit for cocaine trial, A.B. J., June, 1991, at 22.
195. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
196. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
226 [Vol. 45:199
COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL
that has an interest of "transcending value" by placing the burden of
proof on the other party.197 This concern that the risk implicit in the
burden of proof should properly reflect social values was instrumental
in the Court's decision in In re Winship,19 s in which the Court struck
down a New York law that permitted a court to make a finding that a
youth was a delinquent upon a preponderance of the evidence that the
youth had committed acts which would be criminal if committed by an
adult.19 In Eldridge the Court established a multifactored test for de-
termining whether given procedures conform to the requirements of
due process: courts must consider the private interest at stake, the risk
of error in the state's chosen procedures and the probable value of addi-
tional safeguards, and the government's interest in the chosen proce-
dures.20 0 The risk of error was the crucial concern in both Speiser and
Eldridge.0 1
Risk of error and social values were determinative in Addington v.
Texas, in which the Supreme Court revisited the due process questions
surrounding burdens of proof.20 2 Addington's mother challenged his in-
definite commitment to a state mental hospital on the grounds that the
preponderance standard used in the hearing was constitutionally inade-
quate.20 3 The Court agreed, noting that the Eldridge test was applicable
and observing that "[t]he individual should not be asked to share
equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the
individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the
state. '20 4 The Court held that only the higher "clear and convincing"
standard of proof could justify commitment.205 Although the individual
interest was clearly strong, the Court also stressed the normative func-
tion of the burden of proof: "[T]o 'instruct the factfinder concerning
the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the cor-
197. 357 U.S. at 525.
198. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
199. Id. at 359-60.
200. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
201. Two lines of cases diverge from the Court's decision in Winship. Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790 (1952), was the first in a series of cases interpreting the due process clause in light of state
definitions of crimes that placed the burden of proof on the defendant. The cases in the Leland
line concerned themselves principally with determining whether a state was impermissibly at-
tempting to place upon the defendant the burden of disproving an element of the state's case
against him. These cases establish a rule of deference to the states in their definition of criminal
law. As previously discussed, these cases are inapposite to the issue of the burden of proving com-
petence to stand trial because competence is a fundamental constitutional right, which the states
are not free to ignore. See supra part IV.A.2. The second line of cases include Eldridge and those
discussed subsequently in the text. See infra notes 202-16 and accompanying text.
202. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
203. Id. at 421-22.
204. Id. at 427.
205. Id. at 432-33.
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rectness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.' Y)2o6
The Court further highlighted the significance of social values in
setting standards of proof in 1982 in Santosky v. Kramer.20 7 In
Santosky parents challenged the procedures under which New York
state terminated their parental rights. New York law permitted the ter-
mination of parental rights on evidence satisfying a "fair preponder-
ance" standard. 08 The Court applied the Eldridge test, but first noted
that Addington established that due process requires consideration not
only of the private and public interests affected, "but also a societal
judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the
litigants. 20 9 In its analysis of the risk of error factor, the Court noted
the "practical and symbolic consequences" that raising the standard of
proof would have.210 After weighing the several factors, the Court con-
cluded that, as in Addington, due process required at least clear and
convincing evidence.21'
Then-Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that the Court's "myopic
scrutiny of the standard of proof blinds it to the very considerations
and procedures which make the New York scheme 'fundamentally
fair.' -1212 He asserted that due process, as a flexible concept, requires a
"broad look" at the statutory scheme,213 and that such a broad look
reveals that apart from the standard of proof, additional assurances of
accuracy were present in the application of the statute.
Justice Rehnquist also disagreed with the majority's analysis of the
risk of error and argued that the majority had given short shrift to the
risk of error to the state. Citing Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Winship, Justice Rehnquist noted that the preponderance standard is
appropriate "when the interests at stake are of roughly equal societal
importance. ' 214 New York State's interest in the welfare of the child
was certainly as weighty as that of the parents in their continued paren-
tal rights. In such a circumstance, Justice Rehnquist believed that New
York was justified in distributing the risk of error in a roughly equal
206. Id. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
207. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
208. Id. at 747.
209. Id. at 755.
210. Id. at 764.
211. Id. at 768-69. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990), the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the appropriateness of the clear and convincing
standard where "the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 'particularly im-
portant' and 'more substantial than mere loss of money.'" Id. at 2853 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S.
at 756)).
212. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 771 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 775-76.
214. Id. at 787.
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fashion.215
The majority and dissenting opinions in Santosky demonstrate
that the value society places on a decision must complement the risk of
error factor that Eldridge prescribed. Addington and Santosky demon-
strate that the Constitution prescribes a range within which society,
through legislation or court decision, may assign risk between the liti-
gants. The disagreement between the majority and the dissent in
Santosky over the interests to be balanced2 16 demonstrates that societal
values are an elusive, but often determinative, concept.
2. The Eldridge Standard Applied
Because most courts that have addressed the constitutionality of
placing the burden of proof in competency hearings on the defendant
have relied on Leland and its progeny, there is scant analysis of the
issue under the Santosky multifactored test.217
In Brown v. Warden, Great Meadow Correctional Facility' s the
Second Circuit applied the Santosky rule to the preponderance stan-
dard in response to a prisoner's challenge that the reasonable doubt
standard was constitutionally required. The court restricted its analysis
to the private interest affected. The court noted that an erroneous com-
petency determination will not lead necessarily to a conviction, that the
other protections of trial remain in place, and that the trial court must
remain vigilant for signs of incompetence throughout the trial.21 9 Fur-
thermore, the Second Circuit observed that a finding of incompetence
may not be in the defendant's best interest because a commitment for
incompetence may result in greater hardship than a conviction would
have imposed. 220 The court concluded that the preponderance standard
properly balances the risk of error.21
The Second Circuit's enumeration of the private interests affected
raises several questions. The first is whether it is appropriate to con-
sider together the many different scenarios under which competency
hearings arise. While the court quite properly noted that the defendant
may be harmed more than helped by a finding of incompetence 222 and
215. Id.
216. See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. Rav. 1293, 1323 (1982) (stating that the disagreement in
Santosky was over the interests being balanced).
217. For one commentator's application of the test to the competence issue, see Comment,
supra note 76.
218. 682 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 352-53.
221. Id. at 352.
222. There is a great deal of literature on the dangers to defendants of incompetence find-
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that the actors in a trial may possess ulterior motives for raising the
issue,2"' these facts suggest that a single standard of proof is inappro-
priate. More fundamentally, they also suggest that a due process analy-
sis based upon Santosky may not be appropriate because of the
difficulty of identifying reliably the interests of the parties. Specific
cases present vastly differing interests, and the exigencies of analysis, as
well as fairness to a defendant raising a challenge in a specific case,
dictate that these several scenarios should be considered severally. The
analysis in this Note, therefore, proceeds on the basis of a paradigmatic
case in which the defendant raises the issue of competence and in which
there is no danger that a finding of incompetence will be more onerous
than a conviction at trial.224
The first private interest affected in the paradigmatic case is the
interest in a trial that is fundamentally fair because the defendant both
understands the nature of the proceedings and is able to assist his
counsel.225 Although the Second Circuit in Brown was correct in noting
that an error in a competency decision will not lead necessarily to con-
viction,22s this argument should not be overextended. If any homage at
all is due the wisdom of the common law, one must conclude that in-
competence contributes materially to the likelihood of an erroneous
conviction.227 The risk of error in the competency hearing is not attenu-
ated by the possibility that even an incompetent defendant will be
found innocent. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit did identify several
considerations that lessen the significance of the standard of proof, in-
cluding the continuing duty of all actors to monitor the defendant for
ings. See generally Winick, supra note 2; Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the
Court?, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 65; Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, Proposal for the Abolition of the
Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CH. L. REv. 66 (1972); Note, supra note 3.
223. See generally Uphoff, supra note 222; David S. Cohn, Offensive Use of the Insanity
Defense: Imposing the Insanity Defense Over the Defendant's Objection, 15 HAST. CONST. L.Q.
295 (1988).
224. People v. Medina, 799 P.2d 1282 (Cal. 1990), cert. granted, 116 L.Ed. 2d (1991) (see also
supra part III.C), represents just such a case: Medina, who now faces execution, likely would have
preferred an indefinite commitment for incompetence to a guilty verdict which could lead to Cali-
fornia's gas chamber; this is not to suggest, however, that the issue of competence in the paradig-
matic case is not bona fide.
225. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960); see also supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
226. Brown, 682 F.2d at 352. See also Underwood, supra note 7, at 1342-43 (claiming that
competence, as a "prerequisite" fact, "has no necessary relation" to the accuracy of a decision to
convict).
227. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text; see also Ashford & Risinger, supra note
150, part IV (discussing presumption theory and the increased risk of error); Comment, supra note
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signs of incompetence. 2 8 The initial competency decision is not, there-
fore, a final one. 2
The government's interests in the decisionmaking process are also
significant. The cost of committing a defendant to a mental hospital
following an erroneous finding of incompetence can be high.230 The gov-
ernment also has significant interests in the efficient resolution of crimi-
nal charges and in conducting a trial while witnesses' memories are
fresh. Nevertheless, the cost to the government of an error in the deci-
sion is low relative to the cost to the defendant. An erroneous finding of
competence may lead to an erroneous conviction; an erroneous finding
of incompetence will merely postpone the trial. 3 '
Because the allocation of the burden of proof only affects the deci-
sion in close cases, the risk of error is relatively small. Indeed, some
commentators and courts have argued based on statistical theory that
such close cases-where the evidence of competence is in equipoise with
the evidence of incompetence-are too rare to be considered. 232
Due process jurisprudence in the competency context should not be
further befogged by concern for the relevance of simplistic statistical
models. In United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen the Seventh Circuit
rejected Illinois' argument that the burden of proof is immaterial be-
cause the probability of true equipoise is exceedingly small.2 3 In an ap-
pendix to the opinion, the court noted that the model on which this
conclusion is based is objectionable in three respects. First, the Seventh
Circuit noted that factfinders are not likely to perceive evidence along a
continuous spectrum; instead, they "can experience only a small, finite
number of degrees of certainty that a defendant is fit to stand trial.2 34
Second, the model assumes without foundation that the weights of evi-
dence are distributed in such a way that equipoise is rare in fact.23 5
Finally, the model fails to recognize that the burden of proof creates
procedural differences that may skew the results. The court observed,
228. Brown, 682 F.2d at 352.
229. Courts may consider the finality of a decision as a factor in determining whether a given
standard of proof is acceptable. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2854
(1990); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982).
230. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 2, at part L.A (noting that the costs of competency evalua-
tions are "staggering," and citing a study of Dade County, Florida, which found that the cost of
caring for a typical incompetent defendant exceeds $22,000).
231. See Comment, supra note 76, at 998.
232. See United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen, 686 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing David
Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical
Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AbL B. FOuND. IS. J. 487; Daniel J. Kornstein, A Baye-
sian Model of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (1976)).
233. 686 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing People v. Bilyew, 383 N.E.2d 212 (IMI. 1978)).
234. Id. at 1248.
235. Id.
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for example, that the party bearing the burden usually must present
evidence first and argue first.2 86
These criticisms are well taken, and others are available: a simple
hypothetical application of current due process standards reveals the
irrelevance of Illinois' statistical assumption in due process analysis. In
Bilyew Illinois argued that the risk of error was exceedingly small be-
cause the probability of true equipoise is negligible.23 7 If the likelihood
of equipoise truly is negligible, however, then the burden on the govern-
ment is also exceedingly small. The two effects of the supposed rarity of
equipoise cancel each other out; thus, the probability that an equipoise
situation will arise does not affect the result under an Eldridge mul-
tifactored analysis. For purposes of due process analysis, therefore, one
should assume that equipoise may occur. If equipoise does occur, the
risk of error is significant because the preponderance standard of proof
is a relatively low one.
Even using the "broad look" approach that then-Justice Rehnquist
advocated in Santosky,38 the risk of error remains high. Unlike the
New York child welfare system examined in Santosky, competency pro-
ceedings lack the safeguards necessary to protect the individual's inter-
est. Criminal court judges are unlikely to be familiar with the
defendant, and there are no prior proceedings at which the standard of
proof is applied. Competency decisionmaking thus represents the nor-
mal case in which the standard of proof is crucial. 3 9
The interests of all parties in competency hearings are significant
and compelling, and there is a real danger of an erroneous decision. The
three Eldridge factors-in particular, the relatively low cost to the gov-
ernment of an erroneous finding of incompetence24 0-suggest that as-
signing the burden of proof to the defendant is constitutionally
impermissible. This conclusion is reinforced by the significance of the
social values at stake.
3. Social Values and the Equipoise Argument
DiGilio's second argument is that due process requires that when
the evidence concerning a fundamental right such as competence is in
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1245; see also People v. Bilyew, 383 N.E.2d 212 (Ill. 1978); supra notes 65-67 and
accompanying text.
238. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 770 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 212-13 and
accompanying text.
239. Cf. id. at 785 n.12 (distinguishing Santosky from the "normal" case in which "the stan-
dard of proof is a crucial factor in the final outcome of the case").
240. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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equipoise, the state must lose.241 This argument comprises three prem-
ises: First, competence to stand trial is a capability that is fundamental
to due process. Second, the burden of proof when the preponderance
standard is used is most important when the evidence concerning the
fact to be proved is in equipoise. Last, due process requires that evi-
dence supporting the existence of a fundamental capability be weightier
than the evidence against its existence.
Because the preponderance standard reflects a "roughly equal" dis-
tribution of the risk of error between the litigants,242 the allocation of
the burden of persuasion reflects a relatively minor difference in this
distribution. As the DiGilio court noted, the issue essentially is which
party should bear the risk of error when the evidence is in equipoise.2 43
Yet Addington and Santosky held that the Constitution requires that
the distribution of risk reflect society's concern for the interests af-
fected and the nature of the decision. 44 Although the preponderance
standard is permissible whenever the interests are of similar weight, the
question in allocating the burden of persuasion is which, of two roughly
equal interests, is more deserving of the additional protection when the
evidence is evenly stacked.
The defendant's interest in a fundamentally fair trial must prevail
over the state's interests. The common law developed the presumption
of competence as a rule of substantive law245 that provides an initial
burden of production the defendant must overcome before the court
will delay a trial. Once triggered, however, courts should not permit this
device to subject a defendant about whose competence the evidence is
equivocal to the hazards of trial when he is possibly uncomprehending
and unable to assist his attorney. A due process requirement that the
prosecution bear the burden of proving competence to stand trial
merely restates the well-established constitutional importance of the
competency right.
Though criminal defendants may benefit little from a rule which
places on the prosecution the burden of proving competence to stand
trial, the symbolic effects of such a rule should not be overlooked. Espe-
cially with questions such as competence to stand trial, when the pri-
vate and governmental interests are both compelling and when the risk
of error is significant, social values play a dispositive role and dictate
that when the evidence is in equipoise, the factfinder should give the
241. United States v. DiGlo, 538 F.2d 972, 988 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977); see also supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
242. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 787, 788 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
243. 538 F.2d at 988; see also supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
244. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754-55; see also supra part V.B.1.
245. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
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benefit of the doubt to the defendant.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the issue is a very narrow one, the burden of proof in
competency decisionmaking plays important symbolic and instructional
roles. Too often, however, courts have relied on arguments that obscure,
rather than highlight, the significance of these roles. Those who oppose
a due process right in having the prosecution bear the burden have gen-
erally failed to analyze closely the constitutional bases of the cases on
which they rely, and have applied irrelevant evidence law without step-
ping back to ask basic questions about the nature of competency deci-
sionmaking and the presumption of competence. Likewise, those who
advocate such a due process right have advanced arguments that ignore
the purposes of competence to stand trial. Although these advocates ar-
rive at the correct conclusion, their failure to undertake a full due pro-
cess analysis gives little reassurance to legislative decisionmakers and
other courts that their conclusion is correct.
Competency decisionmaking is not usually adversarial; participants
in the criminal justice system often may agree about the defendant's
mental state and cooperate with one another in order to reach a correct
result. This will not always be the case, however, particularly when the
possibility of a death sentence distorts the defendant's options. In such
controversial cases, the courts and legislatures considering the process
should not fall back on the adversarial process without being mindful of
the dangers of doing so, not because an adversarial competency hearing
requires too much of an incompetent defendant, but because the famil-
iar incidents of the adversarial system break down at the system's mar-
gins. Burden of proof is a convenient mechanism for assigning the risk
of error and the responsibility for producing evidence, but it is un-
helpful when the parties are responsible principally for the integrity of
the system and are capable of playing diametrically opposite roles. In
the end, it is more helpful to frame the question in terms of which find-
ing should prevail when the evidence is close rather than which party
should prevail. 46
Ultimately, the value that society places on one's right to be tried
only when mentally competent dictates that a defendant be found in-
competent when the evidence is in equipoise. Although the individual
246. See Pizzi, supra note 32, at 57 (stating that "[o]nce the issue is raised, the court has the
responsibility to determine it correctly," and that "[tihe burden of proving competency belongs to
the court").
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interests of both the defendant and the state are compelling, due pro-
cess dictates that the benefit of the doubt be given to the defendant's
right to a fundamentally fair trial.
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